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Abstract 
I respond to recent criticism of my analysis of the permissive-instructive distinction and outline 
problems with the alternative analysis on offer. Amongst other problems, I argue that the use of 
formal measures is unclear and unmotivated, that the distinction is conflated with others that are 
not equivalent, and that no good reasons are provided for thinking the alternative model or formal 
measure tracks what biologists are interested in. I also clarify my own analysis where it has been 




In the paper “Measuring Causal Specificity” (Griffiths et al. 2015), my co-authors and I outlined 
a formal approach to capturing the notion of causal specificity. Our proposal was to capture 
specificity using mutual information. Though we typically use mutual information to measure the 
association between two variables, when applied to variables on a causal graph it can tell us how 
much control we have over one variable by manipulating another. Following a suggestion of 
Woodward’s (Woodward 2010), I then explored whether these formal measures of specificity 
might help clarify the permissive-instructive distinction (Calcott 2017). Woodward’s suggestion 
was that instructive causes are more specific than permissive causes. I argued that a straightforward 
equivalence between causal specificity and the permissive-instructive distinction did not capture 
key features of the distinction. I then proposed an alternative way of carving up the distinction 
using related information theoretic measures. I captured a permissive cause with a measure of its 
switch-like nature that I called precision. And I argued that although an instructive cause was 
highly specific, it was not specific for an effect, but instead for controlling the relation between 
another cause and its effect (see the paper for details). In biological terms, fine-grained control of 
the DNA (the instructive cause) enables the creation of a robust developmental switch (the 
permissive cause) between two complex states. 
In a response to this paper, Bourrat has offered his own analysis of the distinction (Bourrat 2019b). 
In contrast to me, he argues that the permissive-instructive distinction is equivalent to low-versus-
high specificity. Central to Bourrat’s analysis is the following criticism. Both the “Measuring 
Specificity” paper and my paper on the permissive-instructive distinction treat specificity as fine-
grained control, or what I shall refer to it as range-of-influence specificity for the rest of this paper. 
As Bourrat points out, there is a second concept of specificity discussed by Woodward (Woodward 
2010). This is one-to-one specificity, where each cause has a single effect. According to Bourrat, 
omitting this second kind of specificity leads to a series of errors in my analysis. Once we have a 
way to measure one-to-one specificity, which Bourrat has recently defined (Bourrat 2019a), then 
the permissive-instructive distinction can be captured by combining it with a measure of range-of-
influence specificity. 
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Bourrat is right to point out I did not address Woodward’s one-to-one measure of specificity, and 
that my notion of “precision” is related. However, the claim that omitting this particular 
measurement led my analysis astray is incorrect. 
In what follows, I outline several problems in his critical paper and clarify my own position. First, 
I look at the measure of one-to-one specificity that Bourrat introduces, pointing out where it goes 
awry, and suggesting a replacement. Second, I show that his critical analysis fails to connect with 
the biology as he assumes the distinction is equivalent to those already discussed in philosophy. 
Last, I show that Bourrat mistakes the analysis of a model with the analysis of distinction, thus 
ignoring a central contribution of my paper. 
2 Bourrat’s Many Measures, Clarified and Upgraded 
To avoid a lengthy digression, in this section I assume the reader is familiar with application of 
information theory to measuring causation (see Griffiths et al. 2015). Griffiths and colleagues 
argue that range-of-influence specificity can be captured by measuring the mutual information 
between a cause variable and an effect variable, and call this measure 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶: 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶 = 𝐼(𝐶); 𝐸) 
The hat on the causal variable, 𝐶) , means that we have intervened, setting this variable to a value, 
and then observed the subsequent change in 𝐸. This differs from merely observing 𝐶 and 𝐸. 
Bourrat’s account of one-to-one specificity, both in his commentary and elsewhere (Bourrat 
2019a), discusses three related measures. It is important to distinguish each of them. First, Bourrat 
introduces Variation of Information (𝑉𝐼). 𝑉𝐼-𝐸; 𝐶). = 𝐻-𝐸0𝐶). + 𝐻(𝐶)|𝐸) 
The crucial property of 𝑉𝐼 (in this context) is that when zero, it shows that the mapping between 
cause (𝐶) and effect (𝐸) variables is one-to-one. Much of Bourrat’s discussion focusses on this 
measure. Despite this, when he compares causes in any of his models, Bourrat uses a normalised 
version of this measure (𝑁𝑉𝐼): 
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𝑁𝑉𝐼-𝐸; 𝐶). = 𝐻-𝐸0𝐶). + 𝐻(𝐶)|𝐸)𝐻(𝐶, 𝐸)  
The normalised measure always lies between 0 and 1. Like 𝑉𝐼, when 𝑁𝑉𝐼 is zero, the relationship 
between the variables being measured is one to one. The shift to a normalised version is essential 
because, as Bourrat points out: “everything else being equal, a causal variable with a higher 
entropy will have a higher variation of information with the effect variable, than a causal variable 
with a lower entropy” (Bourrat 2019a). Normalising the measure removes this problem, allowing 
a comparison between variables purely on how one-to-one they are. 
The switch to a normalised measure has some implications I explore below. First, however, notice 
that 𝑁𝑉𝐼 works in the opposite direction to 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶. When 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶 is higher, range-of-influence 
specificity is higher, but when 𝑁𝑉𝐼 is higher, one-to-one specificity is lower. This leads to some 
awkward language, with Bourrat calling it a measure of “un-specificity”, as the higher it is, the 
less (one-to-one) specific the relation is. Given 𝑁𝑉𝐼 is normalised between 0 and 1, we can avoid 
this awkward talk by using the complement of the measure, call it 𝐶𝑁𝑉𝐼: 𝐶𝑁𝑉𝐼 = 1 − 𝑁𝑉𝐼 
With this simple change we get all the same benefits as before, except now both range-of-influence 
and one-to-one specificity increase as their measure increases. When 𝐶𝑁𝑉𝐼 is 1 (when 𝑁𝑉𝐼 is 0), 
the causal relationship is one-to-one. 
Using the complement has another benefit: it clarifies the relationship between range-of-influence 
and one-to-one specificity. Given the definition of 𝑁𝑉𝐼 given above, we can rewrite 𝐶𝑁𝑉𝐼 as: 
𝐶𝑁𝑉𝐼 = 	 𝐻(𝐶), 𝐸)𝐻-𝐶), 𝐸. − 𝐻-𝐸0𝐶). + 𝐻(𝐶)|𝐸)𝐻(𝐶), 𝐸)  
Now, that top row is equal to 𝐼(𝐶); 𝐸), so 𝐶𝑁𝑉𝐼 is equivalent to: 
𝐶𝑁𝑉𝐼 = 𝐼(𝐶); 𝐸)𝐻(𝐶), 𝐸) 
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We see that 𝐶𝑁𝑉𝐼 is simply a causal version of normalized mutual information.1 Thus, the one-to-
one notion of causal specificity that Bourrat actually uses (𝑁𝑉𝐼 rather than 𝑉𝐼) can be substituted 
with normalised (causal) mutual information. Recall that 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶—the measure proposed for range-
of-influence specificity by Griffiths et al.—just is causal mutual information, which is the top row 
in the equation above, 𝐼-𝐶); 𝐸.. We now see a straightforward relationship between the two kinds 
of specificity: one-to-one specificity is simply a normalized version of range-of-influence 
specificity. 
To recap, whilst Bourrat focuses his attention on the variation of information (measure 1),  he uses 
a normalised version of variation of information (measure 2) in all of his analyses. I proposed an 
alternative measure (𝐶𝑁𝑉𝐼), which can be substituted for this second measure. This measure turns 
out to be a normalised version of 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶. As well as having the benefit of requiring far less linguistic 
gymnastics to use, this alternative measure has a much clearer relationship to range-of-influence 
specificity.  
Finally, Bourrat proposes a third measure. Both in his comment and in the paper on one-to-one 
specificity, Bourrat tells us that the correct way to measure causal specificity (and hence to 
distinguish permissive and instructive causes) is to use both measures. For Bourrat, high specificity 
(instructive) causes occur when a cause is both fine-grained (high 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶) and when it is one-to-
one (high 𝐶𝑁𝑉𝐼, low 𝑁𝑉𝐼), and low specificity (permissive) causes occur when is cause has low 
specificity (low 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶) and is not one to one (low 𝐶𝑁𝑉𝐼, high 𝑁𝑉𝐼). 
This is a perplexing move. For though both measures track something referred to as “specificity”, 
I see no reason to meld them together. Nor does Bourrat produce any evidence that combining 
them in this way captures scientists use of the term “specificity”. Futhermore, melding them in this 
way invites confusion, for we now have a distinction with two dimensions. It follows that there 
are cases where one measure may be high whilst the other is low. In fact, DNA, which is at the 
centre of many of these debates about causation in philosophy of science, looks like a candidate. 
Consider the following: there are an enormous number of different DNA sequences and a wide 
 
1 There is more than one way to normalize mutual information. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutual_information 
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range of downstream gene products, yet the relationship is far from one-to-one (there are 
synonymous mutations for a start). So it appears we have high range-of-influence specificity and 
low (or at least, far from maximal) one-to-one specificity. Furthermore, both of these features are 
important. The enormity of possibilities that DNA can support is essential for generating variation, 
and the lack of a one-to-one mapping between genotype and phenotype is crucial for complex 
evolutionary change (Wagner 2011). So the class of causal relationships that are neither high nor 
low specificity (at least according to Bourrat) may well be cases worthy of attention.  
In contrast to Bourrat, I think it better we keep these two concepts of specificity separate, especially 
since we now have a clearer understanding of how to measure them, and how they relate to one 
another. 
Before moving on, I want to discuss one last issue regarding the information theoretic measures 
deployed in these papers. What I call “precision” in my paper is closely related to one-to-one 
specificity, a point that I did not connect to Woodward’s ideas.2 A causal relationship is “precise”, 
in my terminology, if every cause results in precisely one effect (rather than, say, one effect half 
the time, and a different effect the rest of the time). This isn’t necessarily one-to-one, as many 
causes could lead to precisely one effect. Bourrat goes on to claim that his measure is “more 
general” than my own, but this cannot be correct. If something is one-to-one, then it is precise, but 
not vice-versa. This makes the one-to-one relation more restrictive, rather than more general. 
Furthermore, the definition was carefully constructed to define a robust-switch, where many 
different possible states of affairs lead to just a few precise states (such as the relationship between 
many initial conditions and few equilibria in many dynamical systems). So although the measures 
are related, the notion of precision is distinct, and chosen to fit the requirements of my analysis. 
 
 
2 I thank Karola Stotz (pers. comm.) for pointing this out to me. 
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3 Nailing down the Elusive Distinction 
One starting point for my paper was a comment by Woodward in his paper on causation in biology 
(Woodward 2010). Here, Woodward referred to the “elusive contrast” between permissive and 
instructive causes. Like many concepts deployed in biology (consider altruism or evolvability), 
nailing down precisely what the terms ‘instructive’ and ‘permissive’ mean is not straightforward. 
Woodward suggested that causal specificity, or something like it, was at the heart of the distinction. 
It looks amenable to this analysis, as two purported causes are being compared and judged 
differently. To do the distinction justice, however, any clarification must reflect what biologists 
are interested in. Thus, despite its elusive nature, we need to begin by looking at the distinction 
and what role it plays in biology. This should both guide our attempt to provide a definition and, 
once we’ve come up with a definition, verify whether it delivers the right results. So how does 
Bourrat understand the distinction and how does he connect his formal work to the distinction? 
Bourrat begins by equating the permissive-instructive distinction with a distinction from 
philosophy: the notion of background and triggering conditions. A commonly used example that 
captures this distinction is lighting a match: the striking of the match is the triggering condition 
and oxygen is the background condition. In addition, he tells us that a background condition is 
typically less specific and triggering conditions more specific. Bourrat hedges these equivalences 
somewhat (making it less clear what the point of making them is) but the general picture he 
provides is this: 
permissive = background = less specific 
instructive = triggering = more specific 
Both equivalences confuse the picture, rather than clarify what biologists are interested in. First, 
consider the idea that background causes are permissive and triggering causes are instructive. The 
permissive-instructive distinction originated around understanding induction, when the 
introduction of some substance results in a particular developmental pathway being taken. 
Induction looks like a clear case of a triggering cause, occurring against some set of background 
developmental conditions. What biologists have been interested in understanding is whether this 
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triggering cause (the inductor) is permissive or instructive. If we look at the history of embryonic 
induction, we see that, initially, biologists thought that triggers for particular kinds of complex 
organisation in the embryo were instructive. In the end, however, they turned out to be permissive 
(see the Kirschner and Gerhart quote below). The two distinctions are thus not the same. This is 
clear even in the quotations provided by Bourrat:  
Such findings suggest that some substrate molecules may be permissive, inducing 
neurite elongation, but not instructive, in the sense of directing growth in a particular 
direction along a pathway or indicating which way to go at an intersection between 
two pathways (Lemmon et al. 1992). 
Here, the author judges the substrate molecules as either permissive or instructive depending on 
whether they merely permit neurite growth or instead direct that growth in a particular way. If 
Bourrat’s equivalence held, then we would have the odd consequence that these molecules become 
a background or triggering cause depending on whether we judge them permissive or instructive. 
But this is out of step with how biologists think about induction; these molecules are a triggering 
cause, regardless of what specificity we end up assigning them. 
What about the idea that background causes are less specific and triggering causes are more 
specific? Here, Bourrat begs the question. Recall that a central aim of my paper and Bourrat’s 
response was to question whether the instructive / permissive distinction lined up with high / low 
causal specificity. If permissive causes really are background causes and background causes really 
are less specific, then Bourrat has neatly defined things so that his view is already true. 
Bourrat’s presentation of the distinction has not fared well. How does he show his measures match 
the use of the distinction?  
Bourrat provides several examples of biologists deploying the distinction. He then ties these usages 
to his formal definition in the following passage: 
A permissive cause has both a lower causal range of influence (ideally two possible 
states, to act as a switch) and a lower one-to-one specificity (higher normalized 
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variation of causal information) than the other causal variables producing the same 
effect. These other causal variables are instructive relatively to the first cause for they 
have a high(er) mutual causal information which shows they are not a switch and a 
high(er) one-to-one specificity, which shows that they direct a particular outcome. 
These properties match the definitions of permissive and instructive cause used by 
biologists … 
The claim that his analysis “matches the definitions” of the biologists requires a leap of faith, 
however. To begin with, the statements quoted are not definitions, but usages of the terminology. 
Furthermore, the quotations do not contain terms such as “range of influences” or “causal 
variables” or the like, so there is no obvious way to translate their talk to any formal model of 
causation. To show that his analysis captures what biologists are interested in, there has to be some 
interpretation of these passages that links the particular examples to the proposed formal 
definitions. Yet what follows this statement is further discussion of how the formal measures apply 
to the model rather than any attempt to connect these measures to what biologists have said. Nor 
would establishing this connection be an easy task. For part of the elusive nature of the distinction 
is that biologists have used the term loosely. It is not clear at all that the selected quotes pick out a 
single idea. 
Given this lack of clarity, how do I just justify my interpretation of the distinction? Rather than 
attempting to interpret a variety of usages, I focused on the origins and history of the distinction 
as it was applied to embryonic induction. Here, we see that the crucial features of the distinction—
those that distinguish it from other causal distinctions—are intertwined with explaining how a 
simple switch can generate a complex outcome. Here is a concise summary from Kirshner and 
Gerhart: 
… it seemed unlikely to many biologists that the signals of embryonic induction could 
act permissively. The outcome of embryonic induction is complicated; it results in 
creation of virtually the entire organized embryo, with hundreds of cell types and many 
organs, including the entire nervous system, all in the right places. The name 
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“organizer” that Spemann gave to the source of the inducer implied instruction, maybe 
even micromanagement. To everyone’s surprise, embryonic induction turned out to be 
a permissive process; the organizer provides a signal of little complexity (Kirschner 
and Gerhart 2006) 
This passage highlights three key components of the distinction. First, we observe a reliable cause 
(induction) of some complex effect (embryonic organisation). Second, the ability of this cause to 
switch on this complex effect leads us to believe that the cause itself contains the means to produce 
the complexity of the effect (that is, the cause appears to be instructive). Third, somewhat 
surprisingly, the cause turns out to be something simple; it is a mere switch of turning on existing 
complexity (that is, the cause is actually permissive). These three lead to a fourth component: if 
this reliable cause is just a switch, then the cause of this complexity must lie elsewhere. Typically, 
elsewhere means in the DNA (as Scott Gilbert suggests in the citation in my paper). My analysis, 
including the model I constructed and the use of the formal tools, was directed to capturing these 
four components; to showing how a simple switch-like cause can lead to such a complex effect, 
and how we can make sense of the complexity lying elsewhere.  
Highlighting these four components of the permissive-instructive distinction also links it to 
another, more central, debate in philosophy of biology concerning the idea that information is “in” 
the DNA. This connection is important for, as I state in the beginning of the paper, my aim was 
not just to apply formal causal tools to clarify the permissive-instructive distinction. A second aim 
was to show how we can extend our thinking about specificity in DNA beyond just coding for 
proteins to encompass the conditional expression of these proteins. This is a novel contribution to 
an old debate, for it suggests that fine-grained control over conditional expression is one way to 
make sense of DNA encoding something like a program (see the “Causal specificity and gene 
regulation” section in the paper for more on this). 
4 On Models and Mischaracterisation 
In the previous section I outlined some challenges faced when attempting to clarify concepts in 
biology. Formal methods provide one useful tool for addressing these challenges, as they provide 
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a concise language to express and test commitments and relationships that are not obvious in 
ordinary language. In one elegant example of this approach, Ben Kerr and his co-authors formalise 
altruism in several ways, and this explains some controversy in the cooperation literature (Kerr, 
Godfrey-Smith, and Feldman 2004). Both Bourrat and I make use of formal measures of causation 
in our attempts to clarify the permissive-instructive distinction. Though I am confident this 
approach can bring some much-needed clarity to the distinction, we should be clear as to role these 
formal measures play. For while it is possible to apply such measures directly to empirical work, 
here we are applying them to simple models. The aim is to construct a simple model which 
generates, as best we can, the same intuitions as the biological cases. Then, we apply the formal 
measures to the model, fine-tuning them so they capture the biological concepts in play. The role 
of the model and its analysis is thus as a thinking tool, rather than an empirical example, and any 
progress in clarifying the concepts relies on the following set of assumptions: 
1. If the model plausibly represents the relevant biology, and 
2. If the formal measure tracks something in the model that plausibly reflects the concept 
biologists are interested in, 
3. Then, we gain some insight into how to characterise what biologists are interested in. 
Step 1 is crucial here. For no matter how insightful the analysis of a model is, if that model does 
not represent the relevant biology, we have not made progress on the problem (Levy 2011). This 
point is relevant here for I begin my paper by analysing a simple model I call “Woodward’s radio”, 
comprising an on-off switch and a tuning dial which together control the output of the radio. I then 
state that, though this model may be apt for clarifying the notion of causal specificity, it 
insufficiently rich to capture the permissive-instructive distinction. That is why I spent much of 
my paper developing a new model, one capable of capturing the components I outlined in the 
previous section. Bourrat, however, thinks further analysis of this same simple model is all that is 
called for. His justification is that: 
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[…] Woodward’s radio is formally equivalent to the bimolecular example of 
transcription presented in Griffiths et al. (2015). As such, Woodward’s radio also has 
some biological relevance. 
Some biological relevance is far too weak. The model must be relevant to the issue at hand, namely 
defining the permissive-instructive distinction, and there is no attempt to counter my claims of its 
inadequacy. In addition, Bourrat’s attempt to justify the model’s relevance by appealing to its prior 
use in a paper on causal specificity also appears to presume that the permissive-instructive 
distinction is equivalent to causal specificity. But (again) this is the very point in question.  
To see why the radio model is inadequate, we need to think about how the model connects to 
biology. Recall that each causal variable in the model is meant to capture something that can be 
manipulated. One causal variable must capture induction—that some substance is present or not, 
and its presence or absence switches between two distinct effects. What about the other variable? 
The assumption I have made is that this other variable is “in the genes”—in this case what varies 
is the DNA (see the discussion on “two dimensions of variation” in my paper). At a first pass, the 
radio looks like it can capture this—the on-off switch is like the inductor, and the tuning dial is 
like the genes. This is an inviting simplification, but it fails to represent the interaction between 
induction (manipulating one variable) and changes in the DNA (manipulating the other variable). 
In a radio, the on/off switch is reliable (or “precise”, as I define it in the paper). When it is off, the 
radio plays no sound; when it is on, the radio plays whatever channel we choose. An unreliable 
switch, in contrast, might only sometimes turn the radio on (say eighty percent of the time). We 
take the reliability of the switch for granted in a radio and hence also in the model. But in biology, 
the ability to switch between two very different complex states of affairs using a single causal 
factor is something in need of explanation. We need to explain not just the complexity of resultant 
embryonic organisation, but also why it is possible to so easily switch between two versions of 
this organisation by wiggling a single causal variable. After all, it was the capacity to switch so 
easily between the two states that led biologists to (incorrectly) think the inductive cause itself 
contained the requisite instructions for building complexity. The problem is that, in Woodward’s 
radio model, the switch is always a switch. In contrast, in the model I introduced (the Waddington 
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Box), this switch-like capacity is under the control of the other variable. This ability for 
manipulations to the DNA to change how what a switch does and how reliable it is also makes 
sense biologically. For changes to the DNA can affect not only what is expressed, but also the 
conditions under which they are expressed when the DNA plays a regulatory role (such as a cis-
binding region). 
Bourrat does attempt to address the simplificity of Woodward’s radio in a lengthy footnote. He 
suggests a simple extension to Woodward’s radio model make it capable of modifying the 
robustness of the switch. This move just adds to the problem, as it introduces a third causal 
variable—one that directly controls how reliable the switch is. It is unclear how this would be dealt 
with, nor what biological significance it has. Even with this addition, however, the radio model is 
incapable of capturing essential features present in the Waddington Box model. To clarify, here is 
what a radio would have to be like for it to have comparative features. Such a radio might play 
classical music when the switch is ON, and jazz when the switch is OFF. Twiddling with the tuning 
dial might then make the radio play jazz half the time and classical the other half when the switch 
is ON, and play BBC news when the switch is OFF. Twiddle the tuning dial again, and it would 
play BBC news ten percent of the time when switched OFF, jazz the other ninety percent, and 
classic rock when switched ON. In general, for the radio to have an equivalent capacity, the tuning 
the dial must both a) make the switch more or less reliable, and b) cause the switch to choose 
between a variety of different channels.  
I have called this a radio, but the usefulness of the metaphor is lost at this point—no radio is like 
this. The Waddington box model, in contrast, makes this all plain. I begin with a well-known 
physical model for explaining probability distributions and connect it to influential ideas about 
developmental stability and evolution; the model visually demonstrates causal pathways via the 
route a ball takes through the box; and, though significantly more complex than a radio, the model 
is amenable to a complete analysis using information theoretic measures.3 In addition, the model 
 
3 It is interesting to note what Bourrat’s own method of analysis produces when applied to this model. As I show in 
the paper, range-of-influence specificity is low for both variables in a simple competitive analysis. Thus, we should 
conclude, following Bourrat, that neither cause is instructive. Yet, as I show, wiggling the pins produces over three 
million different layouts and over five thousand different ways of distributing the balls. Only a hierarchical analysis, 
as I propose, captures this. 
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demonstrates why the flexibility over the switching mechanism (which is absent in the radio 
model) produces a kind of specificity relevant to evolutionary change. For a crucial feature of a 
regulatory system is that it can wire up existing cues to many different complex outputs in just the 
right way. This point is so important that it is one of the key aspects of Kirschner and Gerhart’s 
theory of facilitated variation: “weak linkage” (Kirschner and Gerhart 2006). 
5 Bourrat’s Hammer 
I’ve outlined numerous gaps and problems in Bourrat’s analysis, but perhaps the core difference 
between our approaches is what we take to be elusive about the permissive-instructive distinction. 
For me, what is elusive is how to best make sense of the distinction given its origins and usage in 
biology. In contrast, for Bourrat, what eludes us is merely how to measure it. He presumes that the 
distinction itself is clear, as he sees no problem in citing several usages of the distinction without 
further clarification. He also presumes that the distinction is adequately reflected in the simple 
radio model, for he deploys this model with little reflection on its limitations. Thus, for Bourrat, 
what remains is merely to figure out the right way to measure the causal interactions in the model. 
Fortuitously, he has just the measure at hand: his own newly minted measure of one-to-one 
specificity (Bourrat 2019a). As I have shown, this approach forces the biology into an existing 
causal distinction rather than furthering our understanding of the permissive-instructive 
distinction. 
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